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In 1996 Mohamed Shahabudeen, then a judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
gave the annual Herch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture at Cambridge University. The topic of 
the lecture, later published in a book, was “Precedent in the World Court”1. In it he spent more 
than 200 pages discussing different aspects of ICJ judgments, including: the possibility of 
judge-made law, stare decisis, distinguishing and departing from previous precedents, ratio 
decidendi and obiter dictum. In short, he discussed the various techniques that the ICJ uses in 
its everyday business – the main particles of which international law (at least as long as it is 
found in judgments) is made of.  
It’s an excellent read. Being steeped both in Common Law and Continental Law 
tradition, Shahabudeen makes the reading of the ICJ’s work, its single most important outcome 
– the written judgment, approachable. For scholars of international courts, it’s a must read. And 
yet, if one wishes to find any guidance as to what constitutes a good judgment or a good legal 
argument, this is not the place to find it. And there are several reasons for that.   
For one, international law scholars read international judgments with reverence. In a 
recent book2 on interpretation in international law, Bianchi writes that “international lawyers 
… do tend to look at the law … from the perspective of the judicial function” and that “this is 
in conformity with the utter deference that international lawyers show towards international 
courts.”3 This reverence towards the written judgment is shared not only by practitioners, but 
by academics as well, despite the fact that they are expected to “keep some distance from the 
object of their intellectual inquiry”.4  
Second, the rise of international courts is a recent phenomenon. At the end of the Cold 
War, there were six international courts in existence; by 2013 there were 23 new courts on top 
of that.5 It was an explosion of new judicial institutions and we are finally starting to catch up 
to its consequences, such as the challenge that they have brought to the standard account to 
international law’s legitimacy.6 
Third, at least when it comes to international courts, there seems to be a fragmentation 
at work, not only in the sense that international courts are predominantly tied to different 
                                                 
1 Mohamed  Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the world court (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
2 Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in international law (Oxford University 
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international regimes,7 but in the sense that the view of their purpose, of what is it that they are 
supposed to do, is fractured.8  
And finally, until recently9 International Law was not seen as a legal system in the 
traditional sense by non-international law scholars. As such the theories and frameworks that 
were developed to measure the quality of justice nationally, were never exported or adapted to 
look at the international courts. Consequently, there are few, if any, standards of what is 
understood as a good judgment. In many ways, for the community of international lawyers, the 
criteria for what is a good judgment or good judicial reasoning are ad hoc in the true sense that 
justice Potter Stewart meant when he said “I know it when I see it”.10 
In this Chapter, I will piece together some general rules of thumb that have been created 
in the branch of International Criminal Law to assess the quality of reasoning of the different 
International Criminal Courts. My focus will be the work of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), although the work of the ICC rests to a large degree on the work of the previous ad hoc 
tribunals. As such, I will analyse the criticisms that have been levelled at the international 
criminal tribunals in terms of their interpretation and reasoning, highlight some of the 
continuing concerns and assess the ICC’s current practice.  
 
International Criminal Law at a Glance  
 
Unlike national legal systems, international criminal law, until the creation of the ICC, 
was a diffused affair. It was diffused in several ways: firstly, as a branch of public international 
law, the sources of legal norms was (and still is) scattered across different treaties and, in a 
significant number of instances, in customary norms and general principles of law.11 It is a 
patchwork of legal obligations to which some states may be part of but others not. So much so 
that when the first post-Cold War ad hoc tribunal was created, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the UN Secretary General had to specify in his report to the 
Security Council that the ICTY should only apply rules of international humanitarian law that 
were “beyond any doubt part of customary law”12 at the time of the commission of the acts. 
Secondly, as the previous paragraph alludes to, there was not one single institution 
responsible for enforcing international criminal law. Rather, until the early 1990s there were 
only two instances of international courts trying individuals, the Nuremberg tribunal and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Far East (ICTFE), both dealing with atrocities 
stemming from the Axis countries in World War II. It is not that individuals were not tried for 
international crimes before World War II13, it is just that this was done through national 
tribunals using domestic criminal procedure.14 Since the end of the Cold War there have been 
                                                 
7 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern anxieties’ 15 Leiden 
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Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
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12 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. 
No. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 34.  
13 See Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46: a Documentary History, (Bedford Books, 
Boston, New York, 1997), pp. 1-14. 
14 Also see Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the hand of vengeance : the politics of war crimes tribunals: with a new 
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not only the ad hoc international tribunals (ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, ICTR) but also mixed international/national tribunals, like the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) who use a mixture of national (usually procedural) and international (usually 
substantive) criminal law in their proceedings.  
Thirdly, the consequence of having so many international/internationalized institutions 
applying international criminal law is that international criminal procedure was left, to a large 
extent, at the discretion of the judges themselves. This does not mean that the procedural 
requirements at the different courts were wildly different, however, since the drafters of the 
statutes put a common requirement of respecting the fair trial rights of the accused as 
understood in international human rights instruments.15 Moreover, despite this scattering of 
substantive and procedural law, including the institutions tasked in applying them, there has 
been a remarkable cohesion and cross referencing between the different institutions. To an 
overwhelmingly large extent, what is understood to be a crime within the ICTY is also a crime 
for the ICTR and SCSL, for example. Similarly, the written opinions between these institutions 
is strikingly similar in both form and substance, something that I will go into more deeply in 
this Chapter.  
In part, the establishment of the ICC was meant to change the fractured landscape of 
international criminal law, and to remove the need for having multiple institutions applying the 
“same” law. Therefore, with the creation of the Rome Statute16 the drafters set up both the 
substantive law – the core international crimes – and the procedural law through specific 
articles in the statute. They later supplemented them by issuing the Elements of Crimes17 and 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence18 through the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties.  
While for those states that have not signed up to the Rome Statute the fractured system 
still remains for the core international crimes (Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Humanity and Aggression), for the those that did sign up to it, the Rome Statute system is the 
best route available. As of November 2016, the number of Member States to the Rome Statute 
was 124, with a total of 139 signatories,19 although this was the time that we saw, for the first 
time, several declarations of withdrawal from the Statute.20 While the ICC has been up to a 
slow start, it has had enough judgments and decisions to make a preliminary analysis of its 
quality of reasoning in its written judgments.  
 
The Legal Authority for the Issuing of Judgments  
 
The ICC draws its authority to issue binding decisions from the Rome Statute. Article 
74, in no uncertain terms, states that “[t]he decision shall be in writing”,21 that it “shall be based 
                                                 
15 For instance, see Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), UN Doc. No. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 106-107. 
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, p. 3. 
17  ICC, Elements of Crimes, 2011, ISBN No. 92-9227-232-2, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff5dd7d2.html [accessed 19 September 2016].  
18  ICC, Rules on Procedure and Evidence, 2013, ISBN No. 92-9227-278-0, available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/legal-texts/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf [accessed 19 September 2016]. 
19  See Status of Ratifications of the Rome Statute, available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en [accessed 19 September 2016]. 
20 At the time of writing three states issued their withdrawals from the Rome Statute: Burundi, Gambia and South 
Africa, Gambia withdraws from International Criminal Court, Al Jazeera, 26 October 2016, available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/gambia-withdraws-international-criminal-court-
161026041436188.html  (last visited 4 November 2016) 
21 Article 74(5) of the Rome Statute 
 
 
on its evaluation of the evidence and the entire proceedings”22, and “shall contain a full and 
reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber's findings on the evidence and conclusions.”23 It urges 
unanimity, but allows for a decision to be taken by a majority of judges24 and also allows for 
the judges in the minority to attach separate or dissenting views.25 The summary of the decision 
is to be delivered orally in open court.26  
In addition, Article 74 contains further mandatory instructions regarding the content 
that a judgment might have. Not only does it require  a reasoned statement of the findings, but 
it also limits the materials that those findings can be based on. It specifies that “[t]he decision 
shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to 
the charges”27 and that it “may base its decision only on evidence submitted and discussed 
before it at the trial.”28 The reasons for these limitations is the protection of  the fair trial rights 
of the accused in the sense that the judges can only use the evidence that has been discussed in 
trial, consequently giving the accused ample warning and time for them to challenge the 
evidence.  
ICC has had plenty of opportunity to clarify the obligations of Article 74. In the Bemba 
Gombo judgment29 it said that it understands the requirement for the evidence to be discussed 
at trial to mean that the evidence   
encompasses not only oral testimony, together with any documents and other 
items, such as video recordings, that were ‘discussed’ during the hearings, but also 
items of evidence that were ‘discussed’ in the written submissions of the parties and 
Legal Representatives at any stage during the trial.30  
 
Moreover, the evidence need not be specifically referenced in the parties’ final submissions, 
but could have been introduced at any point during the trial, so long as the defence has had 
opportunities to challenge the evidence during the trial.31 Furthermore, the ICC has said that it 
is “required to carry out a holistic evaluation and weighing of all the evidence taken together 
in relation to the fact at issue”32 meaning that it is not obligated to refer to every single piece 
of evidence but to take the evidence in its totality.33 
 
Format and Length of Judgments  
 
The format of the judgments issued by the ICC can be discussed on two levels: on the 
formal level of title, parties, summary, reasoning and dispositive, and on the form that the 
different elements within the substantive part of the judgment – the reasoning itself – can take. 
The latter is influenced more by the type of judgment i.e. whether it is a Trial or an Appeal 
Chamber judgment, its length and the complexity of the matter itself.  
                                                 
22 Article 74(2) ibid.  
23 Article 74(5) ibid.  
24 Article 74(3) ibid.  
25 Article 74(5) ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Article 74(2) ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, N° ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016 (hereafter Bemba Gombo judgment) . 
30 Ibid para. 224. 
31 Ibid para. 225. 
32  ICC, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, 1 December 2014, para. 22 (emphasis in 
original).  
33 Bemba Gombo judgment, para. 227. 
 
 
On the formal level, all judgments have the name of the court in both French and 
English, the language of the original judgment (either French or English with one being the 
authoritative), the name of the Chamber that issued the judgment (i.e. Trial Chamber or 
Appeals Chamber), the case name (usually consisting the form of Prosecutor v name(s) of the 
accused and the situation in  relation to which the case is brought up, and whether it is a final 
judgment or a decision on certain points during the trial itself), the case number and the date 
of issuance. Moreover, it is standard to also have the name and title of the judges sitting in the 
trial, the leading members of the prosecution, the defence team, the representatives of the 
Victims and the name of the court Registrar.  
Additionally, within the substantive part of the judgment, when talking about Trial 
Chamber judgments, there is generally a summary of the case and the procedural steps taken 
as well as certain general observations on the peculiarities that are common throughout the case 
such as observations on the general reliability of the witnesses, the victim participation during 
the trial or any problems regarding cooperation with the court that the Chamber might have 
encountered. This is then usually followed by the substantive discussion on the nuts and bolts 
of the case, namely the various charges and the law, the evidence presented and the conviction 
of the judges. In addition, depending on whether it is a Trial or an Appeals Chamber the 
judgment ends with either a dispositive or a pronouncement of relief, respectively, signed by 
the judges.  
However, within the substantive part of the judgments there is a sort of further 
formulaic way in which the judgments are crafted. While the organization of the presentation 
of the judges reasoning can be made in many ways, (e.g.: according to the counts charged by 
the prosecutor; chronologically according to the way that the conflict unfolded; or 
geographically according where the crimes were committed), within each organizing unit there 
is a certain form that the argument takes. Most notably it starts with summarizing the factual 
situation as determined by the evidence taking a particular note of the kind of evidence that 
was used, then it discusses the general requirements of the substantive law on the issue, taking 
note of the elements that need to be proved, (i.e. the elements of the crimes), and then goes on 
to discuss the specific elements and the requirements for the specific elements. In that sense 
the judgment unfolds as series of syllogisms with an intricate pattern of unfolding elements 
going down a tree branch ending with a specific conclusion on each element.  
This structure of the written judgment, I claim, has at least two sources: one is the length 
and complexity of the proceedings and second is the tradition in which international criminal 
law operates, that of public international law. When it comes to the length of the judgment a 
typical judgment has over a hundred pages in length, with some having over a thousand. For 
instance, the recent Prosecutor v Karadžić judgment (ICTY) had over 2600 pages,34 the recent 
Bemba Trial Chamber judgment35 (ICC) has over 320, while the Aleksovski Appeals Chamber 
Judgment (ICTY)36 has 87 pages.  
Which brings us to the complexity of the trials. International criminal trials have long 
been criticized for their length of proceedings.37 For instance, in the Karadžić case38 the time 
                                                 
34 For e.g. see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 24 March 2016 
which has over 2600 pages.  
35 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, N° ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016.  
36 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 24 March 2000.  
37 For an overview of the critics and some answers to the issues of complexity and time see the introduction in 
Stuart Ford, ‘Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts’ [Emory University School of Law] 29 
Emory International Law Review 1, pp. 1-6.  
38  For a graphic timeline see the ICTY case information sheet on the Karadžić trial available at:  
http://www.icty.org/en/cases/radovan-karadzic-trial-key-information (last visited on 11 October 2016).  
 
 
it took from the Prosecutors opening statement to the delivery of the Trial Chamber judgment 
was six years and six months, while the first indictment in the case was filed in June 1995. 
Recently, Ford measured the complexity of the trials at the ICTY using three criteria: legal 
complexity, factual complexity and participant complexity.39 Based on these criteria, the trials 
conducted at the ICTY were scored to be “the most complex set of related criminal cases that 
has ever been tided by any court anywhere”.40  
It is not difficult to see why. For e.g. the international criminal law is wrought with 
legal complexity, not simply because of the fact that its substantive law is scattered in multiple 
sources (treaties) and even in unwritten ones like international custom, or basic legal principles 
common to most nations. Even when we take into account a unified source like the ICC’s 
Statute, the nature of the crimes makes the law complex. For instance, the crime of Crimes 
Against Humanity has general and specific elements which need to be proved such as: wide 
spread or systematic, attack on a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, as general 
elements.41 Moreover, once these general elements are discussed, the specific elements of the 
crime need to be tackled; for instance in the crime of torture those would be that  
 
1) the perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one 
or more persons.  
2) such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the 
perpetrator, and  
3) such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions.42 
 
And this is just one subsection of one criminal provision, Crimes Against Humanity, which in 
the ICC statute has ten other “ways” in which it can be carried out. The crime of War Crimes 
is even more complex, since the nature of international humanitarian law being such as it is, it 
is necessarily divided into war crimes committed in international and non-international 
conflicts, each subdivided into further slots of wilfully killing, torture, pillage etc.43  
Moreover, the possibility of factual complexity can become even more daunting. For 
instance, the ICTY has jurisdiction over the wars in former Yugoslavia, spanning the territories 
of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, dealing with three 
separate conflicts (seen in a timeline) – 1991-1995 (Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia), 1999 
(Kosovo) and 2001 (Macedonia). Should the Milosevic trial have come to its desired end, the 
trial would have spanned the factual situations in three States and nine years of conflict and 
political turmoil. This translates into a large number of facts that need to be established through 
the examination of witnesses and documents, which may or may not be entered into evidence 
and be assigned as specific document number.  
The number of participants involved in the criminal process itself can also be quite 
daunting. While international criminal law follows the similar tripartite structure of most 
criminal trials (prosecutor, defendant and judge) the number of participants can still hover 
around the one hundred mark if we take into account the number of witnesses that can be called 
in one trial. Moreover, in a large number of cases there is more than one defendant standing 
trial.44 This is before we take into account the Rome Statute’s provisions regarding victim 
                                                 
39 Ford, pp. 12-13.  
40 Ibid p. 6. 
41 Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  
42 Elements of Crimes, p. 7 [Article 7(1)(f)]. 
43 See Article 8 of the Rome Statute (War Crimes) which spans a little over four pages.  
44 Ford, pp. 17-19.  
 
 
participation45 where the victims themselves have the right to appoint representatives that can 
file motions and present additional facts and arguments during the trial. If we take Ford’s data 
as an example, the Lubanga trial46 at the ICC “involved 204 trial days, 67 witnesses, and 1373 
exhibits.”47 And this is only the median trial regarding complexity at the ICTY.48 It is no 
wonder that the written opinions are so lengthy. Moreover, the lengthiness and complexity of 
the proceedings, which necessitates a lengthy written judgment, has an impact in the 
judgment’s structure; rather than having one straightforward direction starting from facts, 
finishing with the reasoning for the findings, the usual structure is that the case is organized 
around clusters, such as the crimes committed within a specific location or around counts (e.g. 
Crime Against Humanity – murder) or a combination of the two. In a sense, the final judgment 
can, at times, look like a huge conglomerate of separate judgments on specific clusters.  
The second reason that international criminal judgments take the form that they do is 
the tradition in which international criminal courts are a part, that of international law. If we 
take the judgments of the ICJ as a comparison, we can see that their judgments are structured 
around the issues and arguments that the parties made during the procedure. The ICJ takes 
great pains to summarize and present the arguments of the parties in their best legal form before 
it goes on to deliver its judgment on every single issue that they have raised, even though it 
might not think of a particular argument as a good one. 49  It is not surprising that the 
international criminal tribunals have taken a similar approach in organizing their judgments, 
around issues and legal arguments, especially the Appeals Chamber judgments. After all,  
international lawyers hold international judgments, especially those of the ICJ, with reverence.  
 
Timeliness of Judgments 
 
The right to a speedy trial is one of the key aspects of the right to a fair right,50 
something for which international criminal law has a less than stellar reputation. As the 
international criminal tribunals gathered steam they managed to implement certain measures 
that would make the process run smoother. Most notably, they moved from a party driven 
procedure very akin to the US model51 to a more inquisitorial procedure, giving more power to 
the judges to manage the process and reduce the overall length of the proceedings. The ICC, 
                                                 
45 Articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute.  
46 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. 001/04-01-06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
14 March 2012.  
47 Ford p. 31 
48 Ibid 
49 For instance, Judge Simma had this to say in his separate opinion in the Application of the Interim Accord case: 
I have difficulties to view Greece’s 2008 action as anything but a politically motivated attempt at coercing the 
FYROM to back down on the name issue.  After having been brought before the Court, what the Respondent then 
tried ex post facto was to hide, somewhat desperately and with a pinch of embarrassment, this show of political 
force amounting to a treaty breach behind the three juridical fig leaves, presented as “subsidiary defences” by 
very able counsel (but ad impossibilia nemo tenetur). In the Judgment, these arguments got the treatment they 
deserved. ICJ, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644, 
p. 696.  
50 Salvatore Zappalà, Human rights in international criminal proceedings (Oxford University Press 2003) p. 109-
115. 
51 When the ICTY first drafted their Rules on Procedure and Evidence they borrowed extensively from the US 
Federal Rules of Procedure, leaving the dynamic of the process in the hands of the parties. As is became apparent 
that this led to increasing the length of the proceedings numerous amendments were put in place giving more 
power to the judges to manage the proceedings; see ibid pp. 22-24. 
 
 
for various reasons, including limiting the power of the prosecutor,52 went further and instituted 
a pre-trial process of confirmation of charges, giving the power to the judges to manage the 
handling of the trial process, such as: setting time limits for preparation of the indictment, the 
submission of evidence and calling of witnesses, the possibility of eliminating unnecessary 
witnesses, reviewing the necessity of calling back witnesses, as well as limiting the time 
available for cross-examination of witnesses, among others,53 powers limited by the general 
requirement of fairness of the proceedings.  
Nevertheless, the trials themselves can be quite lengthy compared to domestic trials. 
Using Ford’s data as an example, 68% of US Federal District Courts’ trials between September 
2010 to September 2011 “lasted one day or less”, while “less than half of one percent – lasted 
more than 20 days.” 54  This small comparison does not capture the difference in both 
complexity and timeliness of trials – for one thing it does not measure the time that an accused 
has spent in pre-trial detention, since unlike the US55, in international criminal law there is no 
such thing as the right to post bail. However, if certain guarantees can be made by the 
government where the accused is residing, then arraignments can be made for the accused to 
defend themselves outside custody.56  
Regardless, due to the complexity of the trial process itself it can be years between the 
start of the trial and the rendering of the final judgment, usually after an appeal. For instance, 
in the Katanga case57 the opening statements commenced on the 24 November 2009 and the 
trial lasted till 23 May 2012 when the closing statements finished. The written judgment on the 
other hand was issued on 7 March 2014 nearly two years later. There was no appeal. Moreover, 
this is only considering the actual trial process itself; the ICC also has a pre-trial process where 
the confirmation of charges takes place, which could also take some time. Similarly, with the 
Lubanga case58 also at the ICC, the trial started on 26 January 2009 with the Prosecutor’s 
opening statement and finished with the closing statements on 20 May 2011. The trial chamber 
verdict was issued on the 14 March 2012, 10 months after the end of the proceedings.  
The length of the judgments (several hundred pages long) goes a long way in explaining 
the time required between the closing of the proceedings and the issuing of the final judgment. 
The complexity of the trial also means that the judges themselves might take longer to 
deliberate in order to reach an impartial and objective decision and even longer to justify that 
decision in writing. These factors result in months passing between the closing of the trial and 
rendering the final judgment. International criminal trials are quick only compared to 
continental drift. That said, they are also the most complex trials ever to be held, and the 
timeliness of the judgments reflects that.  
 
Separate and Dissenting Opinions 
 
Article 74(3) and (5) mandate the judges of the ICC to search for unanimity in their 
decisions although it leaves the door open for dissenting opinions. Moreover, it also mandates 
that both the majority and minority views are part of the (single/combined) written decision. 
Consequently, the minority decisions should also follow the same rules regarding the written 
                                                 
52  Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process’ [American Society of International Law] 93 The American Journal of International Law 2 
53 Zappalà pp. 83-115. 
54 Ford p.33 
55 Matthew J Hegreness, ‘America's Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail’ 55 Arizona Law Review 909. 
56 Need to cite!!! 
57 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber Judgment, 7 March 2014.  
58 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber Judgment, 14 March 2012. 
 
 
opinion that I outlined above, namely that they should issue a written, “reasoned statement of 
the […] findings on the evidence and the conclusions”,59 that it should be based on the evidence 
presented during the whole proceedings, and that it should not go beyond the “facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges.”60 
The practice of issuing separate and dissenting opinions dates from the beginning of 
international criminal law i.e. from the International Military Tribunal of the Far East with the 
famous dissent issued by Justice Pal.61 The tradition was continued by the ICTY and ICTR, 
almost without afterthought. The Secretary General’s Report on the establishment of the ICTY 
simply mentions it in passing by saying that “separate or dissenting opinions should be 
permitted.”62 It is equally reflected in the short reference to that effect in the proposed Article 
24 which was later adopted by the Security Council by saying that “separate or dissenting 
opinions may be appended”63 to the judgment. 
The root of the practice of having separate and dissenting opinions is again found in the 
international tradition of international criminal law. Separate and dissenting opinions have been 
a regular feature of international justice since at least the establishment of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1920.64 Almost all international courts have followed this 
practice, the most notable exception being the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU).65 It is surprising that this would be the case given the fact most legal jurisdictions in 
the world, notably those following the French-Continental system, do not have the practice of 
issuing separate or dissenting opinions. I have written elsewhere 66  that this reflects the 
structural realities of the international legal system and the issues of how international courts 
build their legitimacy and legitimize their function, which for the most part is to intrude into 
state sovereignty. Suffice it to say that the practice of issuing separate and dissenting opinions 
can have consequences on both the length of the judgment and the timeliness of delivery.  
 
Accessibility of judgments  
 
The international criminal tribunals have been very careful in their attempts to make 
their judgments accessible to the wider public; not surprising given the fact that several of their 
primary functions (deterrence, the creation of a historical record, didactic function67) can be 
served by accessibility, transparency and dissemination of their work. Given the fragmented 
nature of international criminal law, especially institutionally, the different international 
criminal tribunals have had to accommodate several languages, however, and again due to 
mostly its international tradition, the most used languages (or the working languages of the 
                                                 
59 Article 74(5) of the Rome Statute.  
60 Article 74(2) of the Rome Statute.  
61 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pal, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 12 November 1948, also see 
William A Schabas, ‘Victor's Justice: Selecting Situations at the International Criminal Court’ 43 J Marshall L 
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62 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. 
No. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 110. 
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2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. No. S/25704, 3 May 1993. 
64 See Article 57 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.  
65  For an analysis of the CJEU reasoning style see Mitchel de S. O. L'E Lasser, Judicial deliberations: a 
comparative analysis of judicial transparency and legitimacy (Oxford University Press 2009) pp. 103-141 
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institutions) are English and French. For instance, the working languages of the ICTY are 
English and French,68  however, the proceedings are simultaneously translated in multiple 
languages, depending on the language of the defendants and the victims. The written judgments 
are also available in several languages, most certainly in the language of the accused and, in 
some cases, of the victims, albeit with a fewer resources available.69 Similarly in the ICTR, the 
working languages of the Tribunal are English and French,70 but almost all resources are also 
available in Kinyarwanda, the language of defendants and the victims. 
The situation with the ICC is a bit more complicated, having been established with a 
treaty under with a considerable involvement by the UN. As such the official languages of the 
UN are also the official languages of the ICC: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish.71 All “judgments […],as well as other decisions resolving fundamental issues” are 
translated into the official languages.72 The working languages of the court, on the other hand, 
are the traditional languages of international law, English and French, with the opportunity for 
other languages to become working languages, after a change in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.73 At the request of a party to the proceedings or a State with the right to intervene, 
the ICC can authorise that party to use a different language, provided they give sufficient 
reasons.74 
Moreover, the different institutions have made great efforts to make their jurisprudence 
accessible to actors outside of the international field. When it comes to the ICC, the principle 
of complementarity means that the first jurisdiction responsible for prosecuting international 
crimes is the national one and the ICC can only step in if the state is unwilling or unable to 
carry out the investigations.75 Consequently, the ICC has partnered with external organizations 
to create programs and strategies to make the law of the Rome Statute more accessible to 
national administrations. One such example is the ICC Legal Tools76 database, which has as 
its ambition to become a one-stop-shop for issues of international criminal law – of what are 
the necessary elements for the different crimes in the Statute, where have these or similar issues 
been addressed and what type of evidence has been used. It provides a Case Matrix, an 
Elements Digest, and the Means of Proof Digest. Its scope goes beyond the Rome Statute itself 
and sees the judgments of both national and other international criminal tribunals as highly 
relevant for international criminal law in full. However, the ICC’s understanding of its 
interpretative prerogatives limits the impact that these sources can have, as I shall show in the 
next section.  
 
Rules of Interpretation  
 
                                                 
68 Article 33 of the ICTY statute  
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Modern international criminal law has had a troubled relationship with any rules of 
interpretation. As Schabas has put it, international criminal law at the end of the Cold War was 
“an incomplete shopping list of ancient treaties.”77 To say that the judges of the ad hoc tribunals 
faced a challenge would be to make a gross understatement of the task that they had to 
accomplish. For one thing, this shopping list was not actually the main law that the ad hoc 
tribunals had to follow. What they were tasked to do was to apply rules of international law 
that were, “beyond any doubt part of customary law”78, which could include the provisions 
from the items on the shopping list, but not necessarily. Moreover, while the treaties in question 
did regulate conflict and the behaviour of combatants, they were remarkably scarce when it 
came to elaborating criminal law notions, other than criminalizing it. For instance, while it 
criminalized rape, it did not exactly elaborate as to what conduct qualifies as rape, and the ad 
hoc tribunals took a meandering road in coming up with a viable definition.79  
Seen as a whole, Leena Grover has noted that “such a state of affairs opened the door 
for judges to develop their own methods,”80 either based on their own training, or their own 
understanding of the methods of interpretation prevalent in international law or on their 
“understanding of international criminal law’s normativity”81 In her survey of the ad hoc 
tribunals’ case-law, she has classified several principles or lines of arguments that the tribunals 
have repeatedly used, such as: literal interpretation, logical interpretation, contextual 
interpretation, purposive interpretation, effective interpretation, drafters’ intent and progressive 
interpretation.82  
The ad hoc tribunals have not escaped some stern criticism, however. In his seminal 
paper, Identity Crisis83, Robinson argued that the ad hoc tribunals approach to interpretation 
put in jeopardy the core commitment of a liberal criminal justice system. His argument was 
that while international criminal tribunals have made great strides towards generously 
interpreting the rights of the defendants during the criminal process, they have also interpreted 
its substantive criminal provisions quite broadly, to the detriment of those same defendants. He 
finds that “part of the problem lies in normative assumptions transplanted from human rights 
and humanitarian law”.84 This has led to adopting interpretative approaches from the human 
rights field, making victim protection the raison d’etre of international criminal law, moving 
towards expanding notions of the modes of liability of individuals, especially commanders.85 
Moreover, he argued that during their interpretative efforts the judges conflated the 
structural differences between international criminal law and human rights and humanitarian 
law. Namely, he argued, that international criminal law deals with the determination of the 
guilt or innocence of an individual, and therefore, prescribes certain conduct as criminal or not. 
On the other hand, human rights and humanitarian law regulate the way that a collective, the 
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state or a group, treats individuals or the way that two collectives behave during hostilities. 
One is directed towards individuals, the other towards collectives for the protection of 
individuals. Consequently, Robinson argues, it makes sense that human rights and 
humanitarian law have different modes of responsibility with different thresholds as well as 
different remedies and borrowing from one into the other should be taken with a lot of salt.86 
Lastly, he argued that the influence of ideological assumptions of human rights and 
humanitarian law in the interpretation of international criminal law can undermine its 
commitment to the principles of a liberal criminal justice system. Human rights and 
humanitarian law discourse is ripe with talk about progress in the protection of rights and the 
erosion of sovereignty, making notions about interpretation of rights' conventions as “living 
instruments” quite acceptable.87 On the other hand, in criminal law stability, predictability and 
strict legality make the core of the assumptions regarding the interpretation of the law. If one 
supplants the other it can unleash severe – and arbitrary – intrusions into an individual’s 
autonomy by a collective entity, something that liberal criminal law is designed to stop.88  
This critique89 was taken to heart by the ICC’s judges in their interpretative endeavours. 
Granted they were in a much better position than the early ad hoc tribunals ever were; for one 
they had a much more detailed statute which was negotiated with a wide participation of 
states.90 It was given clear guidelines regarding the hierarchy of law that they are supposed to 
follow;91  it has institutions that are designated to look after the development of the law, 
relieving some of the pressures regarding progressive updates of the law; and most importantly, 
those same institutions have the power to enact supplementary texts (such as the Elements of 
Crimes or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) that help the judges in the interpretation of 
the statute.92 
In addition, Article 22(2) codifies the principle of strict construction, which the ICC has 
interpreted to mean that “it sets a further restriction on the bench’s role of interpretation by 
requiring it, upon completion of its analysis, to discard any meaning derived from a broad 
interpretation that is to the detriment of the accused.” 93  Moreover, clearly answering to 
Robinson’s critic, the Trial Chamber in the Katanga case also noted that  
the aim of the Statute, viz. to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the 
most serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, can under no circumstance 
be used to create a body of law extraneous to the terms of the treaty or incompatible 
with a purely literal reading of its text.94 
Currently, the ICC’s approach to interpretation is clearly outlined in the Bemba 
Judgment: it sees as its hierarchy of laws to start with the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as primary sources.95 Should these sources turn out to be 
ambiguous then the Court will turn to its supplementary sources which include “applicable 
treaties and principles and rules of international law”96 which it interprets to refer to customary 
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international law.97 Moreover, it also notes that “the case law of other international courts and 
tribunals […] is not binding”98 while it also recognizes that it can be useful “where relevant 
and appropriate”. 99  Having a hierarchy of sources is a marked difference to most other 
international courts, who have to balance between treaties, customs and general principles as 
equal sources of law. 
When it comes to having an actual method of interpretation, the ICC has consistently 
upheld Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as the main, if not 
only, method of interpretation.100 Article 31(1) VCLT states that “a treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”101 The ICC, following the mainstream 
understanding102 of Article 31 VCLT, considers it to represent a single rule of interpretation 
consisting of three elements (ordinary meaning, context, and object and purpose) which “must 
be applied together and simultaneously, rather than individually and in a hierarchical or 
chronological order.”103 Moreover, the single rule, thanks to the phrase “good faith”, is taken 
to also include the principle of effectiveness “requiring the … [ICC] to dismiss any 
interpretation of the applicable law that would result in disregarding or rendering any other of 
its provisions void.”104 
However, we should not consider the ICC acknowledgment of the principle of 
effectiveness as an invitation to any expansive reading of the Rome Statute. Quite the contrary, 
it has consistently stressed that the Court “cannot adopt an interpretation method that would 
broaden the definition of crimes, and it is bound to adhere to the letter of the provisions aimed 
at reprimanding only conduct the drafters expressly intended to criminalise”105 and that any 
lingering ambiguity “must be resolved in a manner that is in favour of the … [defendant].”106 
Finally, it has consistently stressed its obligation under Article 21(3), namely, that any 
interpretation of the Rome Statute must conform to “internationally recognised human rights 
norms.”107 As it currently stands, the rights of the defendant are fairly well entrenched in the 
Rome Statute in numerous provisions and the link between the rights of the defendant and 
international human rights is fairly well established. However, it is unclear whether 
international human rights standards will be a framework that will only be used in interpreting 
the rights of defendants or whether that framework will extend to the other side of the equation, 
leading to the same type of problems as outlined in Robinson’s Identity Crisis, for the simple 
reason that there are too few cases to tell. 
 
Conclusions: Quality of Judicial Reasoning in International Criminal Courts 
 
It is hard to give an assessment of the quality of judicial reasoning in international 
criminal courts because they are a bit of an odd duck even among the odd ducks of international 
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courts. They are not designed as typical international courts, nor are they expected to function 
as typical international courts, either. Yet they are not national courts and do not have the 
luxury of operating within a relatively stable legal environment. Quite the opposite, if there is 
one thing that is the hallmark of the beginning of the modern era of international criminal law 
it is its ad hoc-ishness. Thrown into the turbulent waters of an emerging international law 
branch the ad hoc criminal tribunals had to make up a lot of things as they went along. While 
the judges at the ICTY and ICTR could lean on established international law traditions, they 
also had to adapt those same traditions to fit the format of a criminal law trial. As we have seen 
from Robinson’s critique, while they did an excellent job in most areas, they also made some 
quite questionable choices. 
Twenty years into the future, the ICC is in a much better position. While the complexity 
of international criminal trials is, to a large extent, out of the ICC’s control (the complexity of 
the trial reflects the complexity of the situation that it addresses), thanks to the ad hoc tribunals, 
it has the mechanisms and the experience to manage it. Moreover, while the ICC has said that 
the jurisprudence of other international tribunals is only a supplementary source of 
interpretation it is, without a doubt, an invaluable trove of information, of what arguments work 
and what do not, which claim is acceptable and which one is not, and most importantly, what 
the law on this or that particular issue is. While the ICC will still struggle to deliver a timely 
judgment, it has at its disposal twenty years of experience gathered by the ad hoc tribunals in 
managing cases, issuing written judgments and navigating a complex legal and political 
system. It might be a bit too early to issue a concrete judgment on the quality of reasoning at 
the ICC, after all there are less than a handful of completed cases yet (cases that have finished 
with a complete trial phase), however, given the situations that it deals with, it is doing as well 
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